Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games by Christodoulou, George et al.
Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games
George Christodoulou ∗ Vasilis Gkatzelis † Mohamad Latifian ‡
Alkmini Sgouritsa§
Abstract
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of
anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with n agents. We focus on the model
of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior access to the network structure and
can also increase the total cost of an edge (overcharging), and we study classes of games with
concave or convex cost functions. We first consider concave cost functions and our main result
is a cost-sharing protocol for symmetric games on directed acyclic graphs that achieves a PoA
of 2 + ε for some arbitrary small positive ε, which improves to 1 + ε for games with at least
two players. We also achieve a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs and show that no protocol
can achieve a PoA better than Ω(
√
n) for multicast games. We then also consider convex cost
functions and prove analogous results for series-parallel networks and multicast games, as well
as a lower bound of Ω(n) for the PoA on directed acyclic graphs without the use of overcharging.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the classic model of network cost-sharing games introduced by Anshelevich
et al. [2] and Chen et al. [9], where a set of n agents need to use a path that connects a designated
source to a sink in a given graph G. Each edge of the graph is characterized by a cost function, and
the cost of each edge needs to be distributed among the agents that use it in their chosen paths.
Anshelevich et al. [2] considered cost functions that are constant, i.e., independent of the number of
agents that use the edge, and assumed that the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users
(which is known as the Shapley cost-sharing protocol). This gave rise to a, now, very well-studied
class of games where each agent strategically chooses a path that minimizes her share of the total
cost, anticipating the strategic choices of the other agents. It is well-known that the Nash equilibria
of this game can have a high social cost, and a lot of subsequent work has focused on evaluating
exactly how much greater this cost can be compared to the optimal social cost.
Deviating from this line of work which assumed that the cost-sharing protocol for each edge
is predetermined to be the Shapley protocol, Chen et al. [9] instead approached the problem
from the perspective of a designer and asked a compelling question: can we design a better cost-
sharing protocol? In particular, if the designer of a network wishes to minimize the social cost
in equilibrium, what cost-sharing protocol should she choose? Focusing on graphs with constant
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cost functions, they proposed a list of desirable properties that the cost-sharing protocols should
satisfy, they provided characterizations of these protocols, and proved tight bounds regarding their
performance. Following the same research agenda, von Falkenhausen and Harks [35] provided
tight bounds for more general cost functions, but for more restricted network structures, namely
for scheduling games. Our work is motivated by the same question and the main differences are
two-fold: i) we consider more general classes of cost functions than [9] and more general network
structures than [35], and ii) we focus on resource-aware protocols which were recently introduced
by Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [12] and studied by Christodoulou et al. [13].
The class of resource-aware protocols provide a refinement regarding the amount of information
available to the protocol and they provide a middle-ground between the two extreme information
models that were studied in the past. Note that the amount of information that is available to
the protocol plays a central role. For instance, can the decisions of the protocol regarding how to
distribute the cost of an edge depend on the structure of the graph G beyond that edge? Can they
depend on the set of agents that are using the network at any given time? The more information
the protocol has access to regarding the state of the system, the greater the ability of the designer
to reach efficient outcomes. Most of the prior work focused on either omniscient protocols that
have full knowledge of the instance (the structure of the graph and its cost functions as well the set
of agents that are using the system), or oblivious protocols that have no knowledge of the instance,
except the set of users who use the corresponding edge. Previous work has also referred to these
protocols as “non-uniform” and “uniform”, respectively.
These assumptions lie at two extremes of the information spectrum. The former applies to a
very static, or centralized, system where each edge always has access to up-to-date information
regarding the users and the graph G. The latter, on the other hand, is very pessimistic, assuming
that the cost-sharing decisions of each edge need to be oblivious to the state of the system. The
resource-aware model strikes a balance between these two extremes by assuming that the protocol
of each edge knows graph G and the edge cost functions, but is aware only of the set of users who
chose to utilize that particular edge. This model is more realistic than the oblivious one when the
network does not change often, which is the case in many real systems. In that case, the structure
of the graph can be used to inform the design of the cost-sharing protocol of each edge and this
protocol needs only to be updated when the structure of the network is changed. Of course, the
fact that a resource-aware protocol has additional information compared to an oblivious one is only
interesting if this can lead to improved outcomes. Understanding the ways in which this information
can be useful is one of the central goals of this paper.
In designing cost-sharing protocols, the goal is to ensure that the worst-case equilibria of the
induced game approximate the optimal social cost within some small factor. We measure the
performance of these protocols using the worst-case price of anarchy (PoA) measure, i.e., the ratio
of the social cost in the worst equilibrium over that in the optimal solution. Essentially, once the
designer selects the protocol on each edge, then an adversary chooses the requested subset of agents
so that the PoA of the induced game is maximized.
Overcharging. In accordance with some of the recent work on resource-aware protocols [13], we
also consider protocols that use overcharging. This is in contrast to some of the prior work (e.g.,
[9],[35] and [12]) which was restricted to budget-balanced protocols, i.e., protocols such that the
costs of the users using some edge add up to exactly the cost of the edge. Our protocols can instead
choose to charge the users additional costs in order to dissuade them from using some of the edges.
It is important to note that, once we introduce increased costs in our protocols, we compare the
performance of the equilibria in the induced game with the increased costs to the original optimal
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solution with the initial cost functions. Therefore, using this technique requires a careful trade-off
between the benefit of improved incentives and the drawback of penalties suffered.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper we provide several upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy (PoA) of interesting
classes of network cost-sharing games. We consider symmetric games, where the source and sink of
every agent is the same, as well as multicast games, where the sink is the same for every agent, but
the source may be different. In terms of the graphs that we consider, we go beyond parallel link
networks and consider directed acyclic graphs as well as series-parallel graphs. Finally, we consider
different types of functions that describe the costs of the network edges, and we group our results
based on whether these functions are concave or convex.
It is for concave cost functions that we get the main result of the paper (see Section 4).
That is, a resource-aware cost-sharing protocol, the Never-Walk-Alone protocol, which guarantees
a PoA of 2 + ε for symmetric games on arbitrary directed acyclic graphs and some arbitrarily small
constant ε > 0. In fact, for instances that involve more than one agent the PoA of this protocol
drops to 1+ε for an arbitrarily small constant ε. We show that every game that this protocol gives
rise to is guaranteed to possess a pure Nash equilibrium, and every such equilibrium corresponds
to an optimal assignment of agents to paths. The success of this protocol in such a large class of
instances crucially depends on the fact that the cost-sharing decisions depend on the structure of
the graph, and we leverage this power in a novel way, using careful overcharging in order to avoid
suboptimal equilibria despite the decentralized nature of the protocol. Apart from this result, we
also provide an alternative protocol that achieves a PoA of 1 for all symmetric instances with series-
parallel graphs and strictly concave costs, without using any overcharging; with a minor amount of
overcharging, this protocol can also be adapted to get a PoA of 1 + ε even for weakly concave costs
(Section 5). We complement these positive results with two impossibility results for the class of
(non-symmetric) multicast games, for which we show that no resource-aware protocol can achieve
a PoA better than Ω(n) without overcharging and Ω(
√
n) even with overcharging (Section 6).
We then transition to convex cost functions in Section 7. We show that for symmetric games
a simple protocol can achieve a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs, but for directed acyclic graphs
no budget-balanced protocol can achieve a PoA better than Ω(n). Also, for multicast games, we
show that no protocol can achieve a PoA better than Ω(
√
n), even if it uses overcharging.
2 Related Work
The papers that are most closely related to ours are that of Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [12]
and Christodoulou et al. [13], which were the first ones to study the design of resource-aware
protocols for network cost-sharing games. Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [12] considered constant
cost functions, as in Chen et al. [9], and they showed that for outerplanar graphs there exists a
resource-aware protocol that performs better than any oblivious one. On the negative side, they
showed that for general graphs the best protocol performs asymptotically the same with the best
oblivious one. Christodoulou et al. [13] considered more general classes of cost functions beyond
constant ones, as in von Falkenhausen and Harks [35], but were restricted to parallel link networks.
In this paper we combine the strengths of these two papers by studying general classes of cost
functions for larger classes of networks beyond parallel links.
Apart from the aforementioned papers, there are are several others that also focus on the
design and analysis of cost-sharing protocols. Harks and von Falkenhausen [24] applied cost-sharing
protocols to capacitated facility location games and, among other results, showed that omniscient
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protocols can achieve efficiency for convex cost functions and general strategy spaces. Marden and
Wierman [27] studied multiple cost-sharing protocols in a model of utility maximization instead of
cost-minimization. Gopalakrishnan et al. [19] provide a complete characterization of the space of
oblivious cost-sharing protocols that always guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium and
showed that it corresponds to the set of generalized weighted Shapley value protocols. Leveraging
this characterization, Gkatzelis et al. [18] analyzed this family of cost-sharing protocols and showed
that the unweighted Shapley value achieves the optimal price of anarchy guarantees for network
cost-sharing games. Also, Harks and Miller [23] studied the performance of several cost-sharing
protocols in a slightly modified setting, where each player declares a different demand for each
resource. Christodoulou et al. [11] studied network design games with constant cost functions
under the Bayesian setting, where the position of the players’ sources on the graph is drawn from a
distribution over all vertices. They considered overcharging, where they could use any non-budget-
balanced policy under the restriction of preserving budget-balance in all equilibria. More recently
Harks et al. [20] studied cost-sharing in a model that imposes some constraints over the portions
of the cost that can be shared among the agents.
There is also a very close connection between network cost-sharing games and the very well-
studied class of congestion games (e.g., [34], [28], [29], [3], [17], [6], [21], [22]). In particular, a
congestion game can be interpreted as the game that arises from a network cost-sharing setting if
the costs of the resources are divided equally among the agents. For instance, a congestion game
with cost functions that are polynomials of degree d can be cast as a network cost-sharing game
with costs that are polynomials of degree d+ 1 combined with the equal sharing protocol.
The impact of cost-sharing methods on the quality of equilibria has also been studied in other
models: Moulin and Shenker [33] focused on participation games, while Moulin [32] and Mosk-
Aoyama and Roughgarden [30] studied queueing games. Also, very closely related in spirit is
previous work on coordination mechanisms, beginning with the work of Christodoulou et al. [10]
and subsequently in the papers of [25, 4, 7, 1, 26, 15, 14, 5]. Most work on coordination mechanisms
concerns scheduling games and how the price of anarchy varies with the choice of local machine
policies (i.e., the order in which to process jobs assigned to the same machine). Some connections
between cost-sharing policies and coordination mechanisms are also provided in [8].
3 Preliminaries
We study the performance of cost-sharing protocols on classes of network cost-sharing games. A
class of network cost-sharing games, Γ, is defined by a tuple (N ,G, C,÷), which comprises a universe
of players N , a universe of graphs G, a universe of cost functions C, and a cost-sharing protocol
Ξ (formally defined later on). An instance of a cost-sharing game Γ ∈ Γ then consists of a set of
players N ⊆ N , a graph G = (V,E) ∈ G where each edge e ∈ E is assigned a cost function ce
drawn from C, and a cost-sharing protocol Ξ. Each player i ∈ N is associated with a source si and
a sink ti in the graph, and she needs to use a path in G that connects them. For each edge e, the
cost function ce(`) is a non-decreasing function that satisfies ce(0) = 0, and indicates the cost of
this edge when the load on this edge, i.e., the number of players using it, is `.
The outcome of a game is a strategy profile S = (S1, S2, ..., Sn), where Si is the path that player
i chose to connect her source and sink. For each edge e ∈ E, let `e(S) be the number of players
using this edge in their path, i.e., `e(S) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ Si}|. The cost of e in this strategy profile is
ce(`e(S)), and this cost needs to be covered by the players using this edge. In this paper we design
cost-sharing protocols, i.e., protocols that decide how the cost of each edge will be distributed among
its users. A cost-sharing protocol Ξ defines at each strategy profile S a cost share ξie(S) for each
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edge e ∈ E and every agent i ∈ N that uses this edge in S, i.e., such that e ∈ Si. For agents i with
e /∈ Si we have ξie(S) = 0, so only the agents using an edge are responsible for its costs. We denote
the total cost-share of player i in S as
ξi(S) =
∑
e∈E
ξie(S).
Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE). The goal of every user is to minimize her cost-share, so
different cost-sharing protocols lead to different classes of games and, hence, to possibly very
different outcomes. The efficiency of a game, thus, crucially depends on the choice of the protocol.
In evaluating the performance of a cost-sharing protocol, we measure the quality of the pure Nash
equilibria that arise in the games that it induces. A strategy vector S is a pure Nash equilibrium
(PNE) of a game Γ if for every player i ∈ N , and every other path S′i with the same source and
sink as Si, we have
ξi(S) = ξi(Si,S−i) ≤ ξi(S′i,S−i),
where S−i denotes the vector of strategies for all players other than i. In other words, in a PNE
no player can decrease her cost share by unilaterally deviating from path Si to S
′
i if all the other
players’ choices remain fixed. In accordance with prior work, we restrict our attention to protocols
that possess at least one PNE for every Γ ∈ Γ, which are called stable protocols.
Price of Anarchy (PoA). To evaluate the efficiency of a strategy profile S, we use the total
cost C(S) =
∑
e∈E ce(`e(S)), and we quantify the performance of the cost-sharing protocol using
the price of anarchy measure. Given a cost-sharing protocol Ξ, the price of anarchy (PoA) of the
induced class of games Γ = (N ,G, C,÷) is the worst-case ratio of equilibrium cost to optimal cost
over all games in Γ. That is, if Eq(Γ) is the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game Γ, and F (Γ)
the set of all strategy profiles of Γ, then
PoA(Γ) = sup
Γ∈Γ
maxS∈Eq(Γ)C(S)
minS∗∈F (Γ)C(S∗)
.
Budget-balance and Overcharging. We say that a cost-sharing protocol is budget-balanced if
for every edge e and profile S we have
∑
i∈N ξie(S) = ce(`e(S)), i.e., the cost shares that the protocol
distributes to the players using an edge adds up to exactly the cost of that edge. Apart from budget-
balanced mechanisms, we also consider mechanisms that may use overcharging. These mechanisms
define for each edge e a cost function cˆ such that cˆe(`) > ce(`) for some values of `. As a result, the
social cost of a given strategy profile S may be increased from C(S) to Cˆ(S) =
∑
e∈E cˆe(`e(S)). In
these mechanisms, we measure the quality of the equilibria using the new costs, but we compare
their performance to the optimal solutions based on the original cost functions:
PoA(Γ) = sup
Γ∈Γ
maxS∈Eq(Γ) Cˆ(S)
minS∗∈F (Γ)C(S∗)
.
Classes of Games. We evaluate the price of anarchy for several classes of games that may
differ in the strategies of the players, the structure of the graph, or the cost functions used for the
edges. We call a cost-sharing game symmetric if all the players have the same source s and sink
t, and hence the same set of strategies (all the paths from s to t). Most of this paper focuses on
symmetric cost-sharing games, but we also consider games where players have different sources and
the same sink, known as multicast cost-sharing games. In terms of classes of graphs, the two main
ones that we consider are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and series-parallel graphs. The former
include all directed graphs that do not have a cycle, while the latter are defined recursively using two
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simple composition operations (see Section 5.1 for a formal definition). When it comes to classes of
cost functions, the two main ones that we consider are convex functions (exhibiting non-decreasing
marginal costs), or concave cost functions (exhibiting non-increasing marginal costs).
Informational Assumptions. Throughout this paper we focus on the design of resource-
aware cost-sharing protocols. The decisions of these protocols regarding how to share the cost of
an edge e can depend on the set of players using the edge, the structure of the network, and the
cost functions of its machines, but it cannot depend on the set of agents that are participating in
the game, but are not using edge e. This captures the intuition that these cost-sharing mechanisms
are decentralized and are not aware of the set of players that is using the network at any given
time. On the other hand, since the structure of the network and the characteristics of its edges
are not expected to change radically, these protocols can be designed in a way that leverages this
information. This is in contrast to the class of oblivious protocols that are unaware of anything
other than the set of players that use the edge or the class of omniscient protocols that are assumed
to have access to all the information regarding the instance. In this paper we design resource-aware
protocols that take advantage of the additional information that they have access to (relative to
oblivious ones) in order to achieve good price of anarchy bounds in general classes of instances.
Global Ordering. Some of our mechanisms, as well as many protocols in the related work (e.g.,
[31, 13]), decide how to distribute the cost among the agents for a class of games Γ = (N ,G, C,÷)
by using a global ordering over the universe N of players. Then, for any instance Γ ∈ Γ from this
class with a set of players N ⊆ N , this global ordering also implies an ordering of the agents in
N that are actually participating. Based on a global ordering, we use he(S) to denote the highest
priority agent using edge e in strategy profile S, and we refer to her as the leader on this edge.
4 Directed Acyclic Graphs with Concave Cost Functions
In this section we consider a directed acyclic graph G with two designated vertices s and t, and
concave cost functions on the edges. We study symmetric n-player games where each player strives
to establish a connection from s to t. In Section 4.2 we define a family of protocols, which we
call leader-based protocols, and in Section 4.3 we present our main result which is a leader-based
protocol that uses overcharging and achieves a PoA of almost 2.
We also provide some evidence that overcharging is needed in order to achieve constant PoA,
if one focuses on a subset of leader-based protocols that we call static-share leader-based protocols;
we show (in Section 4.4) that, even for strictly concave cost functions, no such budget-balanced
protocol can achieve a PoA better than Ω˜(
√
n). This is in contrast to the case of parallel links
where prior work has shown that such a protocol can achieve a PoA of 1 for strictly concave cost
functions [13]. We leave as an open question the existence of a budget-balanced leader-based (or
any resource-aware) protocol with constant PoA.
4.1 Structure of the Optimal Network
We first observe a property of the optimal solution, i.e., the assignment of users to paths that
minimizes the total cost, for symmetric games. Specifically, we show that when the cost functions
are concave there always exists an optimal solution where all the users are assigned to the same
path connecting the source to the sink.
Lemma 1. Let G be a graph with a designated source s and sink t, and with concave cost functions
on the edges. In any symmetric instance where all the users need to connect from s to t, there
exists an optimal solution which uses a single path from s to t for all the users.
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Lemma 1 implies that for any graph G with source s and sink t, and any number of agents n,
there exists at least one path from s to t such that assigning all n players to that path minimizes
the total cost. The following definition provides us with a way to consistently choose one of these
paths, which will be useful in defining our protocols.
Definition 2. (OPT(`)). For a given symmetric instance, let OPT(`) be an optimal path from
s to t when the total load, i.e., the total number of agents in the system, is `. When there are
multiple such paths, OPT(`) breaks ties arbitrarily but consistently.
4.2 Leader-based Protocols
In this work we consider a class of protocols that we call leader-based protocols. The idea behind
these protocols is that for each edge we (consistently) identify a single player to be the leader
and charge that player some load-dependent amount ψe(`), while the rest of the players share the
remaining cost equally. We study resource-aware protocols, so the choice of the ψe(`) values may
depend on the structure of the graph and the cost functions of all the edges.
Definition 3. (Leader-based Protocol). Given a class of games Γ, a leader-based protocol uses a
predetermined priority ordering pi over the universe of players N . For any strategy profile S, the
protocol identifies a leader on each edge as the highest priority player (according to pi) using edge
e, denoted as he(S). The protocol further defines a value ψe(`) ≤ ce(`) for each edge e and load `.
Then, for each strategy profile S, the cost-share of player i for using edge e is
ξie(S) =
{
ψe(`e(S)) if i = he(S)
ce(`e(S))−ψe(`e(S))
`e(S)−1 otherwise.
We remark that the protocol used in [13] to achieve a PoA of 1 for parallel-link graphs lies
in the class of leader-based protocols, with ψe(`e(S)) being a fixed value when e ∈ OPT(`e(S))
and ψe(`e(S)) = ce(`e(S)) when e /∈ OPT(`e(S)). We call these protocols static-share leader-based
protocols and show in Section 4.4 that their PoA is Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
for DAGs. Note that OPT(`e(S))
corresponds to the path that the optimal solution would use if the total load in the system was
`e(S), and a resource-aware protocol has access to this information since it depends only on the
graph and the edge costs; not on the actual load in the system, which may be different than `e(S).
4.3 An Almost Efficient Leader-based Protocol with Overcharging
In this section we design a protocol that uses overcharging and has PoA = 2 + ε for an arbitrarily
small constant ε > 0; in fact, for instances with n > 1 users the PoA becomes 1 + ε. This protocol
lies in the family of leader-based protocols but it is not a static-share leader-based protocol. The
main idea behind this protocol is that the cost share that the leader pays for each edge decreases
as the cost shares of the other players increase. The cost share of the leader is infinitesimal when
he is not the only one using an edge and therefore he has an incentive to never be alone at any
edge; for this reason, we call this protocol the Never-Walk-Alone protocol.
Our protocol uses a property of DAGs, according to which we can assign weights on the edges
such that for any two paths with the same endpoints the sum of their edges’ weights are equal.
Those weights are used in order to guarantee that the charges of the leader are positive, and the
equality between the weights of alternative paths is used in our main theorem in order to compare
the charges on those paths.
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Lemma 4. Consider a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E). We can assign to each edge e ∈ E an
integer weight we > 0, and to each vertex v ∈ V a value ωv ≥ 0, such that for any two vertices u
and v that are connected through a path p in G, we have
∑
e∈pwe = ωv − ωu.
Proof. Since G is a DAG, we can topologically sort the vertices in V so that all the edges are
directed from left to right. We assign to each vertex v a value ωv equal to its position in the sorted
ordering, and to each edge e = (u, v) we assign the integer weight we = ωv −ωu. Since the vertices
are topologically sorted, for every edge (u, v) we have ωu < ωv, which implies that we > 0 for every
edge e. In other words, the weight of each edge corresponds to the number of vertices ahead in
the topological sorting it points to. It is then easy to verify that for any two vertices, the sum of
the weights of the edges for any path that connects them will be exactly their “distance” in this
topological ordering.
Never-Walk-Alone Protocol. Let OPT(d) be an optimal path from s to t when the total
load is d (according to Definition 2), let C > 2
∑
e ce(|N |) be an arbitrarily large number greater
than the total cost that may ever appear, and let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small value satisfying
 < mine′{ce′(1)}/
∑
ewe, where we is the weight of each edge e implied by Lemma 4. The Never-
Walk-Alone protocol defines a new cost function cˆe for every edge e, satisfying cˆe(`) ≥ ce(`) for any
load `, as follows:
cˆe(`) =

2ce(1) if ` = 1
2(`− 1)ce(`) + e(2ce(`)) if e /∈ OPT(`) and ` 6= 1
ce(`) + e
(
ce(`)
`−1
)
otherwise.
, where e(x) =
weC − x
C
 ,
Then, in order to decide how to share these new (overcharged) costs, the protocol considers a
global ordering pi over the universe of players, and for any strategy profile S it identifies a leader on
each edge, as the highest priority player he(S) using edge e. If there are at least two players using
an edge, then the cost of the leader is the second term of the costs defined in cases 2 and 3 above,
and the rest of the players equally share the remaining cost, i.e., the first term. In other words, for
each strategy profile S, each player i using edge e is charged:
ξie(S) =
{
ζe(`e(S)) if i 6= he(S) or `e(S) = 1
e(ζe(`e(S))) otherwise,
,
where ζe(`) =
{
2ce(`) if e /∈ OPT(`) or ` = 1
ce(`)
`−1 otherwise
.
Note that C is used to guarantee that the leader does not pay a negative cost and  is used
to keep that overcharging arbitrarily small1 and to guarantee that the highest priority player has
an incentive not to be alone in any edge, unless the total number of players in the system is 1, as
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For every game with concave cost functions and at least two players, when we use the
Never-Walk-Alone protocol there is no Nash equilibrium S where the player h with the highest
priority according to pi, among all active agents, is the only user of some edge.
1We remark that for any load ` > 1 and any e ∈ OPT(`) we can avoid even this small overcharging of 
(
ce(`)
`−1
)
by charging all players but the leader ζe(`) =
ce(`)−we
`−1−/C instead of
ce(`)
`−1 and the leader is still charged e(ζe(`e(S))).
For the sake of simplicity we keep this small overcharging.
8
Proof. If player h chooses a path where he is alone in some edge, then he pays at least mine′{ce′(1)}.
On the other hand, if this player chooses a path where he shares every edge with some agent, he
is charged at most
∑
e e(0) ≥
∑
e e(x), for any x ≥ 0. Given the way we restricted  to satisfy
 < mine′{ce′(1)}/
∑
ewe, we have mine′{ce′(1)} > me(0), so h always prefers to share. Therefore,
since he always has the option of sharing, e.g., by just following the path of some other player, a
profile S where he is not sharing will never be a Nash equilibrium.
A crucial subtlety in order to prove our main theorem is to guarantee that no ties appear in the
charges of alternative paths. We assume that the mechanism first applies some arbitrarily small
overcharging using the following lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) and then uses
these cost functions in the protocol definition.
Lemma 6. We can always increase the cost functions by adding arbitrarily small constants in a
way that for any two vertices u, v, any two paths p1 and p2 from u to v, and any strategy profiles
S1, S2, we have ∑
e∈p1
ζe(`e(S1)) 6=
∑
e∈p2
ζe(`e(S2)).
Lemma 7. The Never-Walk-Alone protocol is stable, i.e., it always induces games that possess a
pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We show that for any number of agents, n, the optimal strategy profile S∗ in which all of
the load ` = n is assigned to the optimal path OPT(`) is a pure Nash equilibrium. Consider any
other path p and let p′ and OPT′ be any two edge-disjoint sub-paths of p and OPT(`), respectively,
with the same endpoints u and v, as in Figure 1.
s u v t
OPT′
p′
Figure 1: Network structure if players use one path.
Suppose that ` > 1; the other case is trivial. If all the players use the OPT(`) path, then the
cost share of each of them (including the leader) for the OPT′(`) portion of this path is at most∑
e∈OPT′
ce(`)
`− 1 ≤
∑
e∈p′
ce(`)
`− 1 ≤
∑
e∈p′
ce(1)`
`− 1 ≤
∑
e∈p′
2ce(1),
where the last term is the cost share that any player should pay if they unilaterally deviate to p′.
The first inequality is due to the optimality of OPT(`) and the second due to the concavity of the
cost functions. Since this is true for any two edge-disjoint sub-paths of p and OPT(`), we conclude
that no player has an incentive to deviate to p.
Lemma 8. For any number of players n and any non-optimal strategy profile S in which all the
players use the same path p from s to t, S is not a Nash equilibrium of the Never-Walk-Alone
protocol.
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, let p′ and OPT′ be two edge-disjoint sub-paths of p and
OPT(`), respectively, with the same endpoints (Figure 1); if there are many such paths, pick the
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one with total cost for load ` = n strictly greater than that of OPT′ (there should be at least one,
otherwise p would be an optimal path). Based on the protocol, there is at least one player paying
2ce(`) for every edge e in p
′. Note that∑
e∈p′
2ce(`) <
∑
e∈OPT′
2ce(`) ≤
∑
e∈OPT′
2ce(1) ,
which is the cost share if a player deviates to OPT′. Hence, that player has an incentive to deviate
from p′ to OPT′.
Lemma 9. For any strategy profile S in which players use at least two different paths, S is not a
Nash equilibrium of the Never-Walk-Alone protocol.
Proof. Aiming for a contradiction, assume that there exists some instance where such a strategy
profile S is a Nash equilibrium, and let a1 denote the highest priority player in this instance. Let
p1 be the path that the highest priority player is using in S, and let (v
+, u) be the first edge along
p1 such that some player, denoted as a
+, uses edge (v+, u) without having previously used all the
previous edge in the p1 path; in other words, a1 and a
+ use paths that differ by at least one edge
in getting from s to v+ but they both use edge (v+, u). If no such edge exists, then let v+ = t. Let
p′1 be the sub-path of p1 from s to v+ used by a1, and p+ be the sub-path from s to v+ used by a+.
Since no player enters p′1 before v+ and due to Lemma 5, which states that a1 is not alone in any
edge under s, there must exist some other player a2 6= a1 that uses all of the edges in p′1 (Figure 2).
a1, a2
a+
v+
s t
Figure 2: Network structure if players use at least two paths.
Since a2 is not the leader in any of the edges of p
′
1 (because a1 is), he is charged
∑
e∈p′1 ζe(`e(S))
for p′1. If he deviated to follow p+ instead of p′1 he would be charged at most
∑
e∈p+ ζe(`e(S) + 1).
Since S is a Nash equilibrium, a2 cannot improve his cost by deviating this way, so∑
e∈p′1
ζe(`e(S)) <
∑
e∈p+
ζe(`e(S) + 1) , (1)
where we have a strict inequality due to Lemma 6. However, since a1 is the highest priority player
among all players, his cost for p′1 under S is
(ωv+ − ωs)C −
∑
e∈p′1 ζe(`e(S))
C
 >
(ωv+ − ωs)C −
∑
e∈p+ ζe(`e(S) + 1)
C
 ,
where the inequality is due to (1) and the fact that
∑
e∈p′1 we =
∑
e∈p+ we = ωv+ − ωs. But, the
right hand side of this inequality would correspond to the cost of a1 if he deviates from p
′
1 to p
+.
Therefore a1 has a reason to deviate from p
′
1 to p
+ which contradicts the assumption that S is a
Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 10. The PoA of the Never-Walk-Alone protocol for directed acyclic graphs with concave
functions is at most 2 + ε, for an arbitrarily small value ε > 0. If we assume n > 1, then PoA
= 1 + ε.
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Proof. By Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 the only Nash equilibria are optimal paths so the PoA increases only
due to overcharging.
Recall that in order to avoid ties on players’ charges for alternative paths we increase the
cost functions by arbitrarily small amounts; let ε1 be the total such increment. Moreover, let
ε2 =
∑
e e(0) be an upper bound on the share that the highest priority player may ever pay in any
Nash equilibrium. Note that ε2 depends on the choice of  and therefore can be arbitrarily small.
For n = 1 the overcharging trivially results in PoA ≤ 2 + ε1. For n > 1, the total charges of all
but the highest priority player sum up to the total cost occurred (after the increments for breaking
ties on the cost shares) and therefore, PoA ≤ 1 + ε1 + ε2.
4.4 Static-share Leader-based Protocols
In this section we argue that the approach of [13], which resulted in a budget-balanced protocol
for parallel links with PoA = 1, cannot be successfully applied here. The protocol used in [13] is
a leader-based protocol where, each edge essentially assumes that the set of agents currently using
it are the only active users in the system. If, given that assumption, the particular edge should be
used in the optimal solution, then the leader is charged some carefully chosen fixed cost, otherwise,
the leader is charged the whole cost of the edge, incentivizing that agent to deviate to another edge.
This is an instance of a class of protocols which we refer to as static-share leader-based protocols.
Definition 11. (Static-share Leader-based Protocol). A static-share leader-based protocol is a
leader-based protocol with the following choice of ψe ≤ ce(`):
ψe(`) =
{
ψe if e ∈ OPT(`)
ce(`) otherwise
We next show that no static-share leader-based protocol can guarantee a constant PoA. In
particular, the price of anarchy grows with the number of agents n = |N | of the instance at hand.
Our proof considers concave cost functions for simplicity, but we remark that the lower bound also
holds for strictly concave cost functions as we describe in the proof. Due to limited space the proof
of this theorem can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 12. Any static-share leader-based protocol has PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
for directed acyclic
graphs, even for the class of strictly concave cost functions.
5 Series-Parallel Graphs with Concave Cost Functions
In this section we study instances with series-parallel graphs and strictly concave cost functions and
we are able to design a budget-balanced static-share leader-based protocol with PoA = 1, which
generalizes the protocol used in [13] for parallel-link graphs. In fact, the same protocol extends to
general concave cost functions results with PoA = 1 + , for an arbitrarily small value  > 0, after
applying minor overcharging on the cost functions in order to transform them to strictly concave
functions, similar to [13].
5.1 Preliminaries in Series-Parallel Graphs
Here, we provide the basic definitions and properties of directed series-parallel graphs (SPGs),
based on [16].
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A series-parallel graph (SPG) can be constructed by performing series and parallel compositions
of smaller SPGs, starting with copies of the basic SPG which is an edge. Each SPG has two
designated vertices/terminals called source and sink; regarding the edge which is the basic SPG,
one vertex serves as the source and the other as the sink. One can construct any SPG through a
(not unique) sequence of the following operations:
• Create a new graph, consisting of a single edge directed from s to t.
• Given two SPGs C1 and C2 with terminals s1, t1, s2, t2, form a new SPG C by merging s1
and s2 into one new terminal, s, and merging t1 and t2 into a new terminal, t. This is known
as the parallel composition of C1 and C2.
• Given two SPGs C1 and C2, with terminals s1, t1, s2, t2, form a new SPG C, with terminals
s, t, by merging t1 and s2 and identifying s = s1 and t = t2 as the new terminals. This is
known as the series composition of C1 and C2.
For the rest of the section we will consider a SPG G = (V,M), with source s and sink t,
and C1, . . . , Cr is the sequence of SPGs that are constructed in the process of generating G (with
Cr = G). Let C = {C1, . . . , Cr} and sC , tC be the terminals of any component C ∈ C.
5.2 An Efficient Leader-based Protocol
Here, we study symmetric games where each edge of G has a strictly concave cost function, and
we present a budget-balanced cost-sharing protocol with PoA = 1. In fact, as the following remark
argues, this also implies that we can achieve a PoA of 1 +  for weakly concave cost functions for
an arbitrarily small constant  > 0 if we use a very small amount of overcharging.
Remark 13. Using similar overcharging arguments like the one used in [13], one can transform any
concave cost function into a strictly concave one by replacing any linear portion of the function
with a concave portion that is never more than  times greater. This will achieve a PoA equal to
1 + , where  > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
Protocol Definition. Like all leader-based protocols, this protocol uses a global order pi to
identify the leader he(S) of each edge for each profile S. After carefully assigning values ψe ≤
ce(`e(S)) on the edges of G, the cost share of player i for using edge e is defined as
ξie(S) =

ce(`e(S)) if e /∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i = he(S)
0 if e /∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i 6= he(S)
ψe if e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i = he(S)
ce(`e(S))−ψe
`e(S)−1 if e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i 6= he(S)
In order to complete the definition of the cost-sharing protocol we need to define the ψe’s. In
fact we define a value ψC for each component C ∈ C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. This will be done iteratively
starting from G and following its decomposition in reverse order.
To capture essential information of the network structure, we first define the minimum load `
for which some edge of component C ∈ C is used in the optimal path OPT(`).
Definition 14. (`∗C). Given a component C ∈ C of a SPG, we define `∗C to be the minimum total
load such that C is used in the optimal path OPT(`∗C), i.e., if EC is the set of the edges of C,
`∗C = min{`|EC ∩OPT(`) 6= ∅}.
Next we define the minimum cost required for connecting ` through C.
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Definition 15. (φC). We define φC(`) to be the minimum cost for establishing a path that connects
a load of ` from the source, sC , of C to its sink, tC . Note that φC is a strictly concave function as
the minimum of strictly concave functions2. Trivially, for each edge e, φe = ce.
Remark 16. If C is constructed by the composition of C1 and C2, then if this is a
• parallel composition, `∗C ≤ `∗C1 , `∗C ≤ `∗C2 , φC(`) ≤ φC1(`), and φC(`) ≤ φC2(`) for any `.
• series composition, `∗C = `∗C1 = `∗C2 and φC(`) = φC1(`) + φC2(`) for any `.
We now define ψC for each component C ∈ C so as to guarantee the following properties:
1. any two components that participate in a parallel composition have the same ψ value.
2. the ψ values of any two components that participate in a series composition sum up to the ψ
value of the composed component.
3. ψC >
φC(`)
` for any total load ` such that C is used in the optimal outcome OPT(`).
4. ψC ≤ φC(1).
The first two properties ensure that for each component C, we have ψC =
∑
e∈p ψe for any
(acyclic) path p from sC to tC . The third property guarantees that the highest priority player
always pays more than the rest of the players. Combined with the fact that all alternative paths
have the same ψ, implied by the first two properties, this allows us to show that no two paths can
be used in any Nash equilibrium (Theorem 23). Finally, the fourth property is crucial in ensuring
that the optimal path is a Nash equilibrium; if this inequality did not hold, the highest priority
player could have an incentive to deviate to the path with unit cost φC(1).
Definition 17. (ψC). We define the ψ values iteratively, starting from Cr (recall Cr = G) and
following its decomposition. We set ψCr to be equal to the minimum total cost when a unit load
appears in G, i.e. ψCr = φCr(1). Then, after defining a value ψC for a component C, we move
on to define the ψC1 and ψC2 values of the two components C1, C2 whose composition led to C, as
follows:
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition of C1 and C2, ψC1 = ψC2 = ψC .
• If C is constructed by a series composition of C1 and C2, then we consider two sub-cases:
– if φC1(1) < ψC
φC1 (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
, then we let ψC1 = φC1(1) and ψC2 = ψC − ψC1 .
– if φC2(1) < ψC
φC2 (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
, then we let ψC2 = φC2(1) and ψC1 = ψC − ψC2 .
– if φC1(1) ≥ ψC φC1 (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
and φC2(1) ≥ ψC φC2 (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
, then ψC1 = ψC
φC1 (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
and ψC2 =
ψC
φC2 (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
.
Note that the ψC1 and ψC2 values as defined above always guarantee that ψC1 + ψC2 = ψC .
To see this note that φC1(`) + φC2(`) = φC(`) in a series composition (Remark 16).
In the next lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) we show that ψC ≤ φC(1) which,
as we mentioned above, is crucial for the optimal path to be a Nash equilibrium.
2The cost of each path from s to t is a concave function as it is the summation of concave functions. Due to
Lemma 1, the optimal total cost for each ` equals the minimum cost among those paths.
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Lemma 18. For any C ∈ C, ψC ≤ φC(1).
In the next lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) we show that ψC >
φC(`)
` for
any ` that C is used in the optimal path.
Lemma 19. For any C ∈ C and any ` ≥ `∗C with ` > 1, ψC > φC(`)` ; if `∗C = 1 then ψC = φC(1).
In the next lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) we formally show that for each
edge e, the highest priority player pays at least ψe and the rest of the players pay strictly less than
ψe. This lemma will be used in a key argument in our main theorem (Theorem 23) in order to
show that no two paths can be used in any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 20. For any strategy profile S and any edge e, ξie(S) ≥ ψe if i = he(S) and ξie(S) < ψe
otherwise.
In the next two lemmas we show that the protocol belongs in the class of budget-balanced and
stable protocols.
Lemma 21. This static-share leader-based cost-sharing protocol is budget-balanced.
Proof. Consider any strategy profile S and any edge e. If e /∈ OPT(`e(S)) then the leader, he(S),
covers the whole cost and the rest of the shares are 0; therefore the protocol is budget-balanced for
those edges. If e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and `e(S) > 1, by Lemma 18, the leader covers at most ce(1) (recall
that φe = ce) and the rest of the players cover the rest of the cost by definition. If e ∈ OPT(`e(S))
and `e(S) = 1, by Lemma 19, the player is charged exactly ce(1).
Lemma 22. This static-share leader-based cost-sharing protocol is stable.
Proof. We show that for any load `, the profile where all players choose OPT(`) is a pure Nash
equilibrium. If ` = 1 then the optimal path has the minimum total cost and therefore that player
has no incentive to deviate. For the rest of the proof we assume that ` > 1.
Consider any alternative path p and let C ∈ C be any component composed by a parallel
composition of C1 and C2 such that OPT(`) uses C1 and p uses C2; let OPTC(`) and pC be the
subpaths of OPT(`) and p inside C, respectively3. If any player i deviates to p, she would be alone
at pC and her cost share would be at least φC(1) ≥ ψC (by Lemma 18). However, by Lemma 20,
everybody pays at most
∑
e∈OPTC(`) ψe = ψC . If we aggregate the cost shares over all such C
(those components should be disjoint) we conclude that no player can improve their cost share by
choosing p instead of OPT(`).
Theorem 23. This static-share leader-based cost-sharing protocol has PoA = 1 for series-parallel
graphs with concave cost functions.
Proof. We will show that the only possible equilibrium is an optimal path. Consider any strategy
profile S of total load ` that is not an optimum and for the sake of contradiction assume that it is
a Nash equilibrium.
S is a single path. If S is a single path p, there should be some component C ∈ C composed
by a parallel composition of C1 and C2 such that OPT(`) uses C1 and p uses C2; let OPTC(`)
and pC be the subpaths of OPT(`) and p inside C, respectively. If there are more than one such
components, we choose one with
∑
e∈pC ce(`) > φC(`); there should be such a component, otherwise
S is optimum.
3There should be such a component with source vertex the first vertex that the two paths split and sink vertex
the first vertex that they merge again.
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Let h be the highest priority player overall. For every e ∈ pC , it holds that e /∈ OPT(`)
and therefore the share of h equals to
∑
e∈pC ce(`) > φC(`) =
∑
e∈p∗C ce(`) ≥
∑
e∈OPTC(`) ce(1).
So, player h has an incentive to deviate from pC to OPTC(`) and hence S could not be a Nash
equilibrium.
S is not a single path. Suppose now that S is not a single path. There should be some
component C composed by a parallel composition of C1 and C2 such that some nonzero load uses
both C1 and C2 and it uses only single paths p1 and p2 respectively
4. Let `1 and `2 be the loads using
p1 and p2 respectively and let h1 and h2 be the highest priority players in p1 and p2, respectively.
W.l.o.g. suppose that h1 > h2.
By Lemma 20 h2 is charged at least ψe for edge e and therefore, he is charged at least ψC for
the whole path p2. If h2 deviates to p1 he will not be the highest priority player and, by Lemma 20,
for any edge e ∈ p1 he would be charged strictly less than ψe and therefore strictly less than ψC
for the whole path p1.Hence, h2 has an incentive to deviate from p2 to p1, meaning that S could
not be a Nash equilibrium.
Overall, we ended up with a contradiction showing that S cannot be a Nash equilibrium if it is
not an optimum. Hence, PoA = 1.
6 Multicast Games with Concave Cost Functions
In this section, we show that our positive results for symmetric games with concave cost functions
cannot be extended to the non-symmetric case of multicast network games, i.e., games where each
agent i may have a different source si that she needs to connect to the designated sink t. In
particular we show that even for constant cost functions, which are a special class of concave cost
functions, resource-aware protocols cannot achieve a constant price of anarchy. Specifically the price
of anarchy of any resource-aware protocol grows with the number of agents n in the instance: we
first show a linear lower bound for budget-balanced resource-aware protocols, and then we extend
it to protocols that allow overcharging, obtaining a lower bound of
√
n.
t
s1 s2 s3 sn
v
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
c
Figure 3: A simple acyclic graph with a sink t and sources s1, s2, . . . , sn for each agent. All of the
cost functions are constant, i.e., the cost of the edge is zero if it is not used and some constant if
it is used. The direct edges from the sources to the sink have a constant cost of 1 and those from
the sources to v have a constant cost of 0. The cost of the edge connecting v to the sink is some
constant c, which we define appropriately for the proofs of Theorems 24 and 25.
Theorem 24. There is no resource-aware budget-balanced protocol that can achieve a PoA better
than n for the case of multicast networks with constant cost functions.
4If for any C1 or C2 the load doesn’t use a single path we look at the subcomponent where the structure splits
until we find the required component.
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The proof follows directly from the instance of Proposition 4.12 of [9] and the instance is
presented in Figure 3 where c should be 1. We give the complete proof in the appendix.
Theorem 25. There is no resource-aware protocol even with overcharging that can achieve a PoA
better than
√
n for the case of multicast networks with constant cost functions.
Proof. We again consider the graph of n+ 2 vertices from Figure 3, as in the previous proof, with
the only difference that the constant cost c of the (v, t) edge is set to be equal to
√
n. Note that
this cost function is constant and does not depend on the number of agents using it (its cost is
zero if no agents use it and equal to
√
n if at least one agent uses i). If the resource-aware protocol
uses overcharging but the new costs of the the (si, t) edges after the overcharging are no more
than
√
n for all i, then we consider the instance with n agents with sources s1, s2, . . . , sn and claim
that the strategy profile where every one of these agent uses their (si, t) edge is an equilibrium: a
unilateral deviation through edge (v, t) would cost at least
√
n due to the cost of (v, t), while every
agent’s cost including the overcharging is at most
√
n. On the other hand, if the resource-aware
protocol increases the cost of an (si, t) edge above
√
n for some i, then consider the alternative
problem instance with the same graph, but with only one player, player i, in the system. Since the
resource-aware protocol that decides the cost of edge (si, t) cannot tell the difference between these
two instances, it would still increase the cost of that edge to above
√
n for this instance and force
the agent to pay a cost of
√
n. On the other hand, in the optimal solution for that instance agent
i should just use the (si, t) edge and pay a cost of 1.
7 Convex Cost Functions
For the rest of the paper, we now consider networks convex cost functions rather than concave
ones. We first prove that for convex cost functions, just like in the case of concave cost functions,
there exists a budget-balanced protocol with a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs. This protocol
is the incremental cost-sharing protocol introduced by Moulin [31] and it is the same protocol used
in [13] for parallel links. We note that this is an oblivious protocol, meaning that it requires no
knowledge of the instance other the number of agents using the edge at hand.
We complement this positive result by showing that in symmetric games on directed acyclic
graphs any resource-aware budget-balanced protocol has PoA = Ω(n). For protocols that use
overcharging, we show that optimality cannot be achieved, by showing a lower bound of 1.18, and
we leave as an open question the existence (or not) of a protocol that achieves a constant PoA with
the use of overcharging. However, if we consider games beyond ones that are symmetric, such as
multicast network games, we provide a lower bound of
√
n for all resource-aware protocols even
with use of overcharging.
7.1 Series-Parallel Graphs
In this section we show that in series-parallel graphs (SPGs) with convex cost functions the incre-
mental cost-sharing protocol proposed by Moulin [31] has PoA = 1. The incremental cost-sharing
protocol considers a global order pi of the players and defines the cost-share of each player i for
using edge e to be its marginal contribution if only players preceding him in pi were using e. For
simplicity, for the rest of the section we name the players based on the order pi.
Definition 26. (Prior Load `<ie (S)). Given a strategy profile S and an edge e, we define the prior
load, `<ie (S), for a player i using e to be the load on e due to players preceding i according to pi,
i.e.,
`<ie (S) = |{k < i : e ∈ Sk}| .
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Based on the definition of the prior load we can formally define the incremental cost-sharing
protocol as follows.
Definition 27. (Incremental Cost-Sharing Protocol). Given a strategy profile S, the cost share of
player i for using edge e is
ξie(S) = ce(`
<i
e (S) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S)) .
The following lemma is a key lemma in order to show that the incremental cost-sharing protocol
has PoA = 1. Due to space limitations, the proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 28. Given any Nash equilibrium S, there exists an optimal assignment S∗ such that for
any player i and any edge e ∈ S∗i , it holds that `<ie (S) ≤ `<ie (S∗).
Next we give a technical lemma to be used in our main theorem.
Lemma 29. Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn) be any Nash equilibrium under the incremental cost-sharing
protocol and S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗n) be some optimal assignment satisfying Lemma 28. Then for any
player i and any e ∈ S∗i it holds that
ξie(S
∗
i ,S−i) ≤ ξie(S∗).
Proof. By the definition of the incremental cost-sharing protocol
ξie(S
∗
i ,S−i) = ce(`
<i
e (S
∗
i ,S−i) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S∗i ,S−i))
= ce(`
<i
e (S) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S)) (by the definition of `<ie (S))
≤ ce(`<ie (S∗) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S∗)) (due to Lemma 28 and convexity)
= ξie(S
∗).
Theorem 30. The incremental cost-sharing protocol has PoA = 1 in series-parallel graphs with
convex cost function.
Proof. Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn) be any Nash equilibrium under this protocol and let S
∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗n)
be some optimal assignment satisfying Lemma 28. Then,
C(S) =
∑
i
∑
e∈Si
ξie(S) ≤
∑
i
∑
e∈S∗i
ξie(S
∗
i ,S−i) ≤
∑
i
∑
e∈S∗i
ξie(S
∗) = C(S∗),
where the first inequality is due to the fact that S is a Nash equilibrium and the second inequality
comes from Lemma 29.
7.2 Directed Acyclic Graphs
In this section we consider symmetric games on directed acyclic graphs and prove a lower-bound of
Ω(n) on the PoA of all budget balanced resource-aware protocols. Then, we obtain a lower-bound
of 1.18 for protocols that allow overcharging.
Theorem 31. Any stable budget-balanced resource-aware cost-sharing protocol has PoA = Ω(n)
for directed acyclic graphs with convex cost functions.
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Figure 4: An acyclic graph with a single source s and sink t. All of the cost functions are infinity
for load ` ≥ 2. This graph is used to prove Theorem 31.
Proof. We use the DAG shown in Figure 4 to prove the statement. In this graph all the players
want to go from s to t and the cost of each edge is either 0 or 1 if a single player uses the edge and
infinity if more than one players use it.
Considering n + 1 players, in the optimum, one player uses the (s, t) edge, and the others use
sviuit paths. The total cost of the optimum is n+1. If any other strategy profile was an equilibrium
it would result in an unbounded total cost and give an unbounded PoA. Therefore, there should
exist an optimum strategy profile S∗ that is a Nash equilibrium. Assume w.l.o.g. that in S∗, player
n+ 1 uses the (s, t) edge, and for each i ≤ n, player i uses the sviuit path.
If we now consider the instance in which only the first n players use the network, the strategy
profile in which player i uses the sviuit path should also be an equilibrium. The reason is that
since S∗ is a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate to any other path but the
(s, t) edge, and obviously, no player would prefer the (s, t) edge because she pays the same cost.
The cost of this strategy profile is n. However, the optimum with n players is for one player to use
the (s, t) edge, and the others to use the sviui−1t, for i ≥ 2 with total cost 1. This results in PoA
= Ω(n).
In the following theorem we give a lower-bound of 1.18 for protocols that allow overcharging.
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 32. There is no stable resource-aware cost-sharing mechanism with PoA <
√
33−1
4 ' 1.18,
for directed acyclic graphs with convex cost functions even with overcharging.
7.3 Multicast Games
Here we extend our lower-bounds to multicast games. We prove a lower-bound of
√
n even for
protocols that allow overcharging.
Theorem 33. There is no resource-aware protocol even with overcharging that can achieve a PoA
better than
√
n for the case of multicast networks with convex cost functions.
This lower bound is inspired by the lower bound we gave in Theorem 31. The difference is that
the cost of the (s, t) edge is
√
n for a single player and we use two sources s1 and s2, where from
s2 there are only the alternative paths, namely (s2, t) and s2v1u1t and all other paths start from
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s1. Then the costly equilibria appeared in Theorem 31 can only be avoided by charging the player
using path s2v1u1t at least
√
n. Then if only that player appears in the system, he cannot avoid
the
√
n charge whereas the original cost of the optimum was 1. We give the complete proof in the
appendix.
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A Proofs Deferred from the Main Body of the Paper
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider any optimum allocation with at least two paths p1, p2 from s to t; if there is no
such allocation then all optimal allocations use single paths and the lemma follows. We next show
that shifting one player either from p1 to p2 or the other way around does not increase the total
cost.
Let `e be the load at each edge e under the assumed optimum allocation. Suppose w.l.o.g. that∑
e∈p1
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) . (2)
By cancelling out common edges and using the concavity of the cost functions we get,∑
e∈p1rp2
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2rp1
(ce(`e + 1)− ce(`e)) . (3)
Next we will show that shifting one player from p1 to p2 will not increase the total cost of the
edges belonging to p1 ∪ p2, hence the overall cost will not increase since the load on the rest of the
edges remains intact. The total cost of the edges in p1 ∪ p2 after a player shifts from p1 to p2 is
equal to ∑
e∈p1rp2
ce(`e − 1) +
∑
e∈p1∩p2
ce(`e) +
∑
e∈p2rp1
ce(`e + 1)
≤
∑
e∈p1rp2
ce(`e) +
∑
e∈p2rp1
ce(`e) +
∑
e∈p1∩p2
ce(`e) =
∑
e∈p1∪p2
ce(`e) , (by using (3))
where
∑
e∈p1∪p2 ce(`e) is the current total cost of the edges in p1 ∪ p2. Next we need to show that
(2) still holds for the new allocation. This implies that if all the players are shifted from p1 to p2
the cost will not increase and therefore p2 would be an optimal allocation.
Let `′e be the new load on edge e after shifting a player from p1 to p2. Obviously, `′e ≤ `e for
any e ∈ p1 and `′e ≥ `e for any e ∈ p2. Then, due to concavity,∑
e∈p1
(ce(`
′
e)−ce(`′e−1)) ≥
∑
e∈p1
(ce(`e)−ce(`e−1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2
(ce(`e)−ce(`e−1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2
(ce(`
′
e)−ce(`′e−1)) .
Therefore, (2) holds for the new allocation and the lemma follows.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let e1, . . . ek be all the edges and r be an arbitrarily big constant. At first, we round up
all the costs to r decimal places, i.e., for each edge e and load `, we round up ce(`) to the closest
multiple of 10−r. Then we increase cei(`) by N !∞′−(∇+N !〉), where N is the maximum number of
players ever appears. After these increments, for any ei, any cost share ζe(`) has some non-zero
values at decimal places from r + N !(〉 − ∞) +∞ to r + N !〉 and the rest of the decimal places
greater than r have zero values. Since each edge appears at most once in a path, the cost shares of
two different paths are equal if and only if they have the same set of edges.
Note that the increment at each edge is upper bounded by 10r and therefore can be arbitrarily
small as it only depends on the choice of r.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 12
Proof. In order to show this lower bound we construct a graph with appropriate edge cost functions.
Consider the graph of Figure 5 which is basically a Braess’s network with edge (s, u) replaced by
multiple edges e1, . . . , er. The edges (v, u) and (u, t) have constant cost of 0 and 2k, respectively,
for some integer k ≥ 6. The cost of the edge (v, t) equals the load on that edge. For the rest of the
edges we define the cost functions as follows:
c0(`) =
{
` if ` ≤ k
k otherwise
, cj(`) =
`
jk2
+
Hj−1
k
+ εj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ r ,
where Hj is the harmonic number, i.e. Hj =
∑j
i=1 1/i, for j ≥ 1 and H0 = 0, and 0 < ε1 < ε2 <
. . . < εr <
1
r2k2
are used to guarantee a single optimum for each `. r should be some integer such
that cr(1) < 1; we set r = 2
k that satisfies this inequality if someone notice that H2k−1 ≤ k− 1 for
k ≥ 6.5
s
u
v
t
c0(`)
c2(`
)
e2
0
`
2k
c3(
`)
e3
c1(
`)
e 1
cr(`
) er
Figure 5: Graph where PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
for all static-share leader-based protocol.
For simplicity we denote by sv, vu, ut and vt, the edges (s, v), (v, u), (u, t) and (v, t). Moreover,
by svt we denote the path using edges sv and vt and similarly for the rest of the paths.
First note that, for ` ≤ k, c0(`) + ` ≤ 2k meaning that the only optimal path for that load is
the svt. It is not hard to verify that
c0(`) + ` > c1(`) + 2k , for ` ≥ k + 1 , (4)
cj(`) < cj+1(`) , for ` ≤ (j + 1)k , (5)
cj−1(`) > cj(`) , for ` ≥ jk + 1 , (6)
for all j ≥ 1. Inequality (4) indicates that for ` ≥ k + 1 the path svt cannot be the optimum.
Inequalities (5) and (6) indicate that among all edges connecting s to v, ej has the minimum cost
for jk+ 1 ≤ ` ≤ (j+ 1)k. Let `∗ be the minimum load such that cr(`∗) > k meaning that for ` ≥ `∗
the only optimal path is the svut; note that `∗ > rk + 1. In Table 1 we summarize the optimal
path for each load.
5We remark that our result holds for strictly concave functions as well. To see this, one can add − /` to all cost
functions and verify that all arguments still hold for sufficiently small  > 0.
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` OPT(`)
[1, k] svt
[jk + 1, (j + 1)k], 1 ≤ j < r sut through ej
[rk + 1, `∗ − 1] sut through er
[`∗,∞] svut
Table 1: Optimal paths for the network of Figure 5.
Consider now n = r2k2 players and any Nash equilibrium S of any static-share leader-based
protocol. We show that PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
First note that if more than n/2 players use some of the edges connecting s to u, due to concavity
the minimum cost occurred if all those players use the same edge (Lemma 1) and due to inequality
(6) this edge is er. Therefore, the total cost is at least cr(n/2) > r/2. It is easy to check that
`∗ ≤ rk2 < n (recall that `∗ is the minimum load such that cr(`∗) > k) and hence the optimum is
for all players to use the path svut with total cost 3k. So, PoA > r6k = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.6
Now for the rest of the proof suppose that at least n/2 players use sv under S. We distinguish
between three cases based on which path the highest priority player overall, h, uses in S.
h uses svt : If any edge connecting s to u is used under S, definitely one of its users is charged
by at least 1/rk2. If that player deviates from that edge to svu, he would pay at most 2/r2k as he
wouldn’t be the highest priority player in sv; h is. But, 2/r2k < 1/rk2, for k ≥ 6, meaning that S
couldn’t be a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, only the paths svut and svt can be used in S. If `ut(S) ≤ k, then `vt(S) ≥ n − k
resulting in PoA > n/3k = Ω(n/ log n). So we consider at last the case that `ut(S) > k meaning
that for any ` ≥ `ut(S), ut ∈ OPT(`). First note that any player but h using vt pays either 1 or
0. The reason is that since vt ∈ OPT(1), the ψvt defined by the protocol should be 1 so that it is
budget-balanced. Similarly, ψsv = 1. This further means that h is charged at least 2 for using svt.
We take two cases on the value of ψut.
• ψut > 1: player hut pays more than 1 for the path vut and if he deviates from vut to vt he
would pay at most 1, as we mentioned above.
• ψut ≤ 1: player h currently pays at least 2 and if he deviates from svt to sut he would pay
strictly less than 2, since the unit cost of any edge connecting s to u is less than 1 and the
charge for using ut would be ψut since ut ∈ OPT(`eut(S) + 1).
Hence, S cannot be a Nash equilibrium in this case. Overall, if h uses svt, PoA = Ω(n/ log n).
h uses sut : Similarly as above, if `ut(S) ≤ 2k + 1, PoA = Ω(n/ log n), so we assume that
`ut(S) ≥ 2k + 2. If vt is used under S, then hvt pays at least 1 for vt whereas if he deviates from
vt to vut he would pay less than 1 since he is not the highest priority player, h is. Therefore, vt
cannot be used in S, meaning that hsv follows the path svut. It is easy to argue now that every
edge connecting s to u is used under S, otherwise hsv would have an incentive to deviate to the
empty edge. This is because hsv pays at least 1 for sv and the unit cost of any su edge is less than
1. By Claim 34 PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
6This is true because
√
n
log2 n
= rk
(log 22kk2)2
< rk
(log 2k)2
= r
k
.
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h uses svut : In this case we can argue right away that every su edge is used under S, otherwise
h would have an incentive to deviate to the empty edge. Then again by Claim 34 PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
Claim 34. If n = r2k2 players appear and every su edge is used in some Nash equilibrium S, then
PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
Proof. We first argue that each edge ej , for 1 ≤ j ≤ r, is used by at least jk players, apart
maybe from one. To show this we will prove that there are no two edges ej , ej′ such that both
ej /∈ OPT(`ej (S) + 1) and ej′ /∈ OPT(`ej′ (S) + 1). Suppose on the contrary that there exist two
such edges and w.l.o.g. let hej > hej′ . Player hej′ pays for ej′ at least ψej′ > 0 and if he deviates
to ej he would pay zero for that edge as he would not be the highest priority player in ej and
ej /∈ OPT(`ej (S)+1). Therefore, since S is a Nash equilibrium, all but one edges ej should be used
by at least jk players.
Now it is easy to compute that the total cost of S is at least
r−1∑
j=1
cj(jk) ≥ 1
k
r−2∑
j=0
Hj =
1
log r
((r − 1)Hr−2 − (r − 2) = Θ(r) .7
The optimal total cost is 3k, which gives PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 18
Proof. We are going to prove this lemma by induction starting from G. For G the statement holds
by definition.
Suppose that ψC ≤ φC(1) for some C ∈ C. We will show that the statement also holds for its
components C1, C2 as well.
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition, for both i ∈ {1, 2}, it holds by Remark 16 that
ψCi = ψC ≤ φC(1) ≤ φCi(1).
• If C is constructed by a series composition, if the first case holds in the definition of ψCi , then
the statement trivially holds. If the second case holds then
ψCi+1 = ψC − ψCi ≤ φC(1)− φCi(1) = φCi+1(1),
where the inequality holds by assumption and the last equality is due to Remark 16.
7We use the property
∑n
j=1Hj = (n+ 1)Hn − n.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 19
Proof. We also prove this lemma by induction starting from G. For G by definition ψCr = φCr(1)
and since φCr is a strictly concave function ψCr >
φCr (`)
` for any ` > 1.
Suppose that the statement holds for some C ∈ C. We show that the statement also holds for
its components C1, C2 as well.
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition, for any i ∈ {1, 2}, we consider two cases:
– `∗Ci = 1: by Remark 16, `
∗
C = 1 and further φC(1) = φCi(1). By the definition of ψCi
and the assumption that C satisfies the lemma’s statement,
ψCi = ψC = φC(1) = φCi(1) .
– `∗Ci > 1: for any ` ≥ `∗Ci ,
ψCi = ψC >
φC(`
∗
Ci
)
`∗Ci
=
φCi(`
∗
Ci
)
`∗Ci
≥ φCi(`)
`
,
where the first inequality is because C satisfies the lemma’s statement for `∗Ci ≥ `∗C
and `∗Ci > 1 (`
∗
Ci
≥ `∗C is true due to Remark 16). For the second equality note that
if φC(`
∗
Ci
) < φCi(`
∗
Ci
) the optimal path wouldn’t go through Ci, which contradicts the
definition of `∗Ci .
• If C is constructed by a series composition, then for any i ∈ {1, 2} we consider again two
cases:
– `∗C = 1: it holds by assumtion that ψC = φC(1) and by Remark 16 that `
∗
Ci
= 1.
Therefore, by definition, ψCi = ψC
φCi (1)
φC(1)
= φCi(1), which is what is required for `
∗
Ci
= 1 .
– `∗C > 1: here it is either ψCi = φCi(1) >
φCi (`)
` for any ` > 1, or ψCi ≥ ψC
φCi (`
∗
C)
φC(`
∗
C)
. In the
second case:
ψCi ≥ ψC
φCi(`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
>
φC(`
∗
C)
`∗C
φCi(`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
=
φCi(`
∗
C)
`∗C
≥ φCi(`)
`
.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 20
Proof. We distinguish between two cases:
• e /∈ OPT(`e(S)): for i = he(S), ξie(S) = ce(`e(S)) ≥ ce(1) = φe(1) ≥ ψe by Lemma 18. The
rest of the players are charged 0.
• e ∈ OPT(`e(S)): for i = he(S) then ξie(S) = ψe by definition. If it exists i 6= he(s∗) then
`e(S) > 1. Additionally, since e ∈ OPT(`e(S)), `e(S) ≥ `∗e. By using Lemma 19 twice,
ξie(s
∗) =
ce(`e(S))− ψe
`e(S)− 1 <
ce(`e(S))− ce(`e(S))`e(S)
`e(S)− 1 =
ce(`e(S))
`e(S)
< ψe .
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 24
Proof. This follows directly from the instance of Proposition 4.12 of [9] and we include it only for
completeness. Consider an instance with n players, each one with a source si and a common sink
t as in Figure 3, and the constant edge costs are as they appear in the figure with the cost of the
(v, t) edge being equal to 1. It is easy to verify that the strategy profile where every player i uses
the direct edge (si, t) to get to the sink is an equilibrium for any budget-balanced resource-aware
protocol. In particular, since there is only a single player that uses each (si, t) edge, every budget-
balanced protocol will need to charge each of these agents a cost of 1. Any unilateral deviation
would also cost them 1, however, due to the cost of (v, t). In the optimal solution all agents share
the (v, t) edge and the social cost is 1 instead of n.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 28
Proof. Starting from any optimum S∗ we swap subpaths of carefully selected players and end up to
some optimum satisfying the lemma’s statement. The swaps appear in rounds in each component
starting from G and following its decomposition (Cr, . . . , C1) (recall that G = Cr). We say that a
strategy Si passes through component C if it uses some of its edges.
For each component C (starting from Cr and reducing the index) we reallocate the optimum
inside C by using the following reallocation procedure:
• If C is constructed by a series composition, we do not do any reallocation and proceed to the
next component.
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition of C1 and C2, for players i from 1 to n, if
– both Si and S
∗
i pass through C,
– w.l.o.g. Si passes through C1 and S
∗
i passes through C2 and
– there exists j > i such that S∗j passes through C1
switch the subpaths of S∗i and S
∗
j inside C
Note that after the above procedure, the new S∗ has the same total cost with the initial profile
and therefore is still an optimum. For the final optimum S∗ (after considering all components) we
prove the following claim.
Claim 35. For any player j and any component C that S∗j passes through, it holds that for any
player i < j, if Si passes through C so does S
∗
i .
Proof. We prove the claim by induction starting from G and following its decomposition. The
claim is trivially satisfied for G.
Suppose that component C satisfies the claim; we will show that also C1 and C2 that compose
C satisfy the claim. We distinguish between the two possible cases of how C was composed.
C is constructed by a series composition of C1,C2. It is easy to see that any path
passes through C should also passes through both C1 and C2 and therefore both C1, C2 satisfy the
statement of the claim.
C is constructed by a parallel composition of C1,C2. For the sake of contradiction
assume that C1 doesn’t satisfy the statement and so there exists j and i with i < j and such that
Si and S
∗
j pass through C1 but not S
∗
i ; let i be the minimum such index. Since C satisfies the claim’s
statement, S∗i should pass through C and therefore through C2. Note though that while processing
i during the round considering C in the above reallocation procedure, there shouldn’t exist any S∗j′
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with i < j′ passes through C1 otherwise S∗i should have been swapped with that; therefore there
shouldn’t exist S∗j . However, since we assumed that S
∗
j passes through C1 ultimately, it should
have been swapped afterwards with some other optimal subpath, but this proves the existence of
some S∗j′ passing through C1 with i < j
′ < j while processing i.8 This is a contradiction meaning
that C1 should satisfy the statement as well.
Claim 35 holds for every edge e ∈ S∗i and trivially we get `<ie (S) ≤ `<ie (S∗).
A.9 Proof of Theorem 32
Proof. We use the DAG shown in Figure 6 to prove the statement. In this graph all the players
want to go from s to t and the cost of each edge is as indicated in the figure if a single player uses
the edge and infinity if more than one players use it.
s
v
u
t
√ 33−1
8
,∞
0,∞
0,∞
√ 33−1
8
,∞
0
,∞
1,∞
Figure 6: A simple acyclic graph with a single source s and sink t. All of the cost functions are
infinity for load ` ≥ 2. This graph is used to prove Theorem 32.
Considering three players a, b and c, in the optimum one player uses the upper edge, and
the other two the svt and the sut paths. The total cost of the optimum is
√
33−1
4 + 1. If any
other strategy profile was an equilibrium it would result in an unbounded total cost and give an
unbounded PoA. Therefore, there should exist an optimum strategy profile S∗ that it is a Nash
equilibrium. Assume w.l.o.g. that in S∗, a uses the upper edge, b uses the svt path, and c uses the
sut path.
If we consider now the instance in which only b and c use the network, either the strategy profile
in which b uses the svt path, and c uses the sut path is an equilibrium, or one of b or c pays at least
1 in S∗. The reason is that since S∗ is a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate
to any other path but the upper one, and if neither b, nor c pays more than 1, obviously none of
them would prefer the upper edge.
For the first case the cost of this strategy profile is
√
33−1
4 , and the optimum with two players
is one player to use the zig-zag path (suvt), and the other to use the upper edge with total cost 1.
This results in PoA ≥
√
33−1
4 .
For the second case if one of b or c pays at least 1 in S∗ the cost of S∗ becomes at least
√
33−1
8 +2
8Note that the order we process C’s in the reallocation procedure guarantees that any reallocation after processing
C does not affect the input of C, so S∗j cannot be swapped to pass through C1 after processing C.
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and we have
PoA ≥
√
33−1
8 + 2√
33−1
4 + 1
=
√
33− 1
4
.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 33
Proof. We use the graph shown in Figure 7 to prove the statement.
s1 s2
v1u1v2u2un−1vnun
t
0,∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,
∞
0,
∞
0,∞
1,∞
0,∞
1,∞
1,∞
0,∞
√
n,∞
Figure 7: An acyclic graph with a two sources s1 and s2, and sink t. All of the cost functions are
infinity for load ` ≥ 2. This graph is used to prove Theorem 33.
Considering n+1 players where the first and the last players want to connect s2 to t, and others
want to connect s1 to t. In the optimum, one of the players with source s2 uses the right edge,
the other uses the s2v1u1t path, and other players use s1viuit paths for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. The total
cost of the optimum is n+
√
n. If any other strategy profile was an equilibrium it would result in
an unbounded total cost and give an unbounded PoA. Therefore, there should exist an optimum
strategy profile S∗ that is a Nash equilibrium. Assume w.l.o.g. that in S∗, player n + 1 uses the
right edge, player 1 uses the s2v1u1t path, and for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n, player i uses the s1viuit path.
Now we consider two cases:
Case 1: Player 1 is charged at most
√
n for the s2v1u1t path.
In this case we consider the instance in which only the first n players use the network. The
strategy profile in which player 1 uses the s2v1u1t path, and for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n, player i uses
the s1viuit path should be an equilibrium. The reason is that since S
∗ is a Nash equilibrium, no
player has an incentive to deviate to any other path but the right one, and the only player that
might have the incentive to deviate to the right edge is player 1. Since player 1 pays less than
√
n
in s1viuit, she does not have the incentive to deviate either, and hence this strategy profile is an
equilibrium with the total cost of at least n. However, the optimal strategy for these players is for
player 1 to use the right edge and others to use the s1viui−1t paths, with total cost
√
n. Threfore,
we have PoA ≥ √n for this case.
Case 2: Player 1 is charged more than
√
n for the s2v1u1t path.
In this case we consider a single player who wants to connect s2 to t. The optimal strategy for
such player costs 1, but with the assumption that she should pay at least
√
n, and hence we have
PoA ≥ √n in this case too.
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